I/Q Imbalance Aware Nonlinear Wireless-Powered Relaying of B5G Networks:
  Security and Reliability Analysis by Li, Xingwang et al.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
6.
03
90
2v
1 
 [e
es
s.S
P]
  6
 Ju
n 2
02
0
1
I/Q Imbalance Aware Nonlinear Wireless-Powered
Relaying of B5G Networks: Security and Reliability
Analysis
Xingwang Li, Senior Member, IEEE, Mengyan Huang, Student Member, IEEE, Yuanwei Liu, Senior
Member, IEEE, Varun G Menon, Senior Member, IEEE, Anand Paul, Senior Member, IEEE, and
Zhiguo Ding, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—Physical layer security is known as a promising
paradigm to ensure security for the beyond 5G (B5G) networks
in the presence of eavesdroppers. In this paper, we elaborate
on a tractable analysis framework to evaluate the reliability
and security of wireless-powered decode-and-forward (DF) multi-
relay networks. The nonlinear energy harvesters, in-phase and
quadrature-phase imbalance (IQI) and channel estimation errors
(CEEs) are taken into account in the considered system. To
further improve the secure performance, two relay selection
strategies are presented: 1) suboptimal relay selection (SRS);
2) optimal relay selection (ORS). Specifically, exact analytical
expressions for the outage probability (OP) and the intercept
probability (IP) are derived in closed-form. For the IP, we
consider that the eavesdropper can wiretap the signal from the
source or the relay. In order to obtain more useful insights, we
carry out the asymptotic analysis and diversity orders for the OP
in the high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime under non-ideal
and ideal conditions. Numerical results show that: 1) Although
the mismatches of amplitude/phase of transmitter (TX)/receiver
(RX) limit the OP performance, it can enhance IP performance;
2) Large number of relays yields better OP performance; 3)
There are error floors for the OP because of the CEEs; 4) There
is a trade-off for the OP and IO to obtain the balance between
reliability and security.
Index Terms—B5G, channel estimation error, in-phase and
quadrature-phase imbalance, nonlinear energy harvester, physi-
cal layer security
I. INTRODUCTION
The goals of the fifth generation (5G) and beyond (B5G)
wireless networks can provide reliable communication among
almost all aspects of life through the network with higher
date rate, lower latency and ubiquitous connectivity [1]. The
security has been identified as an vital factor for wireless
communication systems, which has triggered enormous inter-
ests from both academia and industry [2, 3]. However, due to
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the broadcast characteristics of wireless communication, it is
difficult to ensure secure communication for the wireless net-
works without being eavesdropped by un-authored receivers.
The conventional methods to ensure the security of wireless
communication are to use encryption algorithms, which im-
pose extra computational overhead and system complexity [4].
In addition, with the rapid development of chip and computer
technologies, conventional encryption technologies can not
provide perfect security.
As an alternative way to ensure security, physical layer
security (PLS) has sparked a great deal of research interests
[2]. The basic principle of PLS is to exploit the inherent
randomness of fading channels to resist the information to
be extracted by eavesdroppers [3]. Recently, there are a great
of research works investigated the PLS under various fading
channels, e.g. see [5–8] and the references therein. In [5], a
secure transmit-beamforming of the multiple-input multiple-
output (MIMO) systems over Rayleigh fading channels was
designed, in which the maximal ratio combing (MRC) re-
ceivers were adopted to maximize the signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) at main receiver. The authors of [6] investigated the
PLS of artificial noise aided MIMO systems over Rician fading
channels. Meanwhile, the secure performance of the classic
wiretap model was discussed over the generalized Gamma
fading channels and the analytical expressions of the strictly
positive secrecy capacity (SPSC) probability and the lower
bound for the secrecy outage probability (SOP) were derived
[7]. On the other hand, the authors investigated the secrecy
performance over κ− µ shadowed fading channels of classic
Wyner’s wiretap model and the approximate expressions on
the lower bound for the SOP in the high SNR region and
SPSC probability with the aid of a moment matching method
have been obtained [8].
In actual situations, it is difficult to have direct links between
the sources and the destinations due to shadow fading and/or
obstacle, so it is indispensable to use the relay to complete
the communication [9, 10]. In light of this fact, relaying
assisted transmission has been identified as one of the key
technologies in the current and future wireless cooperative
networks [11, 12]. The signals can be decoded and trans-
ferred from the source to the destination by using low cost
and low power consumption relay nodes. In general, there
are two basic relay protocols: i) amplify-and-forward (AF)
[13–15], and ii) decode-and-forward (DF) [16, 17]. In [13],
2the authors studied the ergodic capacity (EC) performance
of fixed-gain AF dual-hop (DH) networks and derived two
analytical expressions on the EC bound. Extending to multi-
hop networks, the authors of [14] derived the EC, outage
probability (OP) and average symbol error probability by the
generalized transformed characteristic function approach. In
[15], the authors investigated the performance of a multi-hop
AF communication network over Nakagami-0.5 channels and
the closed-form analytical approximate expressions for the OP,
ASEP and EC were obtained. To maximize confidentiality, the
authors in [16] investigated the secure performance of multiple
DF relay systems.
When deploying multiple relays in the systems, it will incur
extra inter-relay (IR) interference and energy consumption. To
avoid this problem, relay selection (RS) has been proposed
[18]. Among the various RS schemes, optimal relay selection
(ORS), suboptimal relay selection (SRS) and MRC are the
most prevalent ones [19–21]. The pioneering work of the
ORS scheme has been proposed by Bletsas according to
selecting the relay with the largest instantaneous end-to-end
SNR [22]. Based on the ORS, the authors in [19] investigated
the symbol error rate (SER) of AF relay systems. To reduce
the requirement of channel knowledge, the authors proposed
a SRS scheme that the optimal relay is selected according to
the link either source-relay or relay-destination [20]. Cognitive
radio inspired cooperative relay systems was introduced, and
the secure outage performance was studied over independent
and non-identically distributed Nakagami-m fading channels.
In [21], the authors compared the secrecy outage performance
of cognitive radio networks for ORS, SRS with MRC schemes
over Nakagami-m fading channels.
Although the performance of wireless cooperative networks
can be improved by appropriate relay protocols and RS
scheme, the operation of wireless communication system is
constrained by power shortages of their wireless devices. This
happens that in some cases the nodes are deployed in the
remote or power limited areas [23]. In light of this context,
some energy harvesting (EH) techniques have been proposed
to prolong the life of the batteries of such wireless transmission
devices [24, 25]. Among the various EH techniques, radio
frequency (RF) enabled simultaneous wireless information and
power transfer (SWIPT) attracts a lot of attentions because it
can overcome the limitations of some other renewable energy
resources such as solar energy, wind energy and magnetic
induction that can only be used in some specific circum-
stances [26]. In addition, RF signals are ubiquitous in elec-
tromagnetic waves, and EH in RF is green, safe, controllable
and reliable [27]. There are usually two common protocols
for SWIPT systems: i) time-switching (TS) and ii) power-
splitting (PS) [28–30]. For TS, the authors in [28] investigated
the outage performance of SWIPT-assisted non-orthogonal
multiple access (NOMA) relay systems over Weibull fading
channels. Considering PS protocol, the secure performance
of two-way relaying systems was researched through a joint-
optimization solution over geometric programming and binary
particle swarm optimization [29]. Additionally, a large-scale
RF-EH technique with PS protocol was adopted, and the OP
performance and average harvested energy were analyzed [30].
The aforementioned studies are based on the assumption of
ideal hardware components and perfect channel state informa-
tion (CSI), which is unrealistic in practical communication sys-
tems. In practice, due to component mismatch and manufac-
turing non-idealities, these monolithic architectures inevitably
have defects associated with the RF front-ends, thereby lim-
iting the overall system performance [31]. A typical example
of these impairments is the in-phase and quadrature-phase
imbalance (IQI), which refers to the mismatches of amplitude
and phase between I and Q branches of the transceiver. This
will result in incomplete image suppression and ultimately lead
to degradation of the performance for the total communication
system [32]. Ideally, the I and Q branches of the mixer have
an amplitude of 0 and a phase shift of 90◦, providing an
infinitely attenuated image band; however, in practice, the
transceiver is susceptible to some analog front-end damage,
and these damages introduce errors in the phase shift resulting
in amplitude mismatch between the I and Q branches, thereby
damaging the down-converted signal constellation, thereby in-
creasing the corresponding error [33]. Motivated by the above
practical concern, several research contributions have studied
the systems secure performance in the presence of IQI [34–
36]. Under the assumption of uncorrelation between channel
of each subcarrier and its image, Ozdemir et al. in [34] derived
an exact expression for the SINR of OFDM systems with
IQI at transceivers. The authors analyzed the impact of joint
IQI on the security and reliability of cooperative NOMA for
IoT Networks [35]. Considering backscatter communication,
Li et al. in [36] derived analytical expressions for OP and
the intercept probability (IP) of ambient backscatter NOMA
systems under IQI. On the other hand, imperfect CSI (ICSI)
may be existed due to the presence of channel estimation errors
(CEEs) and feedback delay. Therefore, it is of great practical
significance to study the impact of ICSI and IQI on the security
performance of cooperative networks.
A. Motivation and Contribution
Motivated by the above discussion, we study the reliabil-
ity and security of cooperative multi-relay networks in the
presence of nonlinear energy harvesters, ICSI and IQI. Under
these imperfect conditions, three RS schemes, random relay
selection (RRS), SRS, ORS are considered. Specifically, we
derive the analytical expressions for the OP and IP. For the
security, the direct transmission and cooperative transmission
through relay are considered. In this study, we assume that
the source and relay nodes of the networks are configured
with nonlinear energy harvesters to harvest energy from the
nearby power beacon under different saturation thresholds.
This is reasonable in some applications, such as internet-of-
things (IoT), mesh networks and Ad Hoc networks, etc. The
main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• Considering IQI and CEEs, we propose three represen-
tative RS schemes, namely RRS, SRS and ORS. RRS is
considered as a benchmark for the purpose of compari-
son. In SRS, the optimal relay is selected according to the
channel conditions either the S−Rm or the Rm−D. In
ORS, the optimal relay is selected according to the link
3qualities both the S − Rm and the Rm −D. The major
difference between our work and [37] is that to study the
effects of IQI caused by the mismatches of amplitude and
phase between I and Q branch.
• Different from the most existing research works, we use a
more realistic nonlinear EH model due to the nonlinearity
of the electronic devices [38, 39]. We have the assumption
that nonlinear energy harvesters are equipped at source
and relays, which can harvest energy from the nearby
power beacon.
• For the reliability, we derived the exact analytical ex-
pressions for the OP of the proposed system for the
three RS schemes. For the security, we consider two
typical scenarios that direct transmission and cooperative
transmission, the exact closed-form analytical expressions
of the IP for the two scenarios are derived.1
• To obtain more insights, we derived the asymptotic ana-
lytical expressions and diversity orders for the OP of the
three RS schemes under non-ideal conditions. It reveals
that there are error floors for the OP due to the non-
zero CEEs, and the OP performance is limited by the
IQI parameters.
B. Organization and Notations
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section
II, we present a brief introduction of the considered system
model. In section III, the reliability of the considered system
for the three RS schemes is studied in terms of OP, while the
security is analyzed through deriving expressions of the IP. In
section IV, some numerical results are provided to verify the
correctness of our analysis. Finally, we present a conclusion
of this paper in Section V.
We use |·| to define absolute value. The notations E{·} and
, denote the expectation and definition operations, respec-
tively. e ∼ CN
(
µ, σ2
)
defines a complex Gaussian distribu-
tion with a mean of µ and a variance of σ2. Pr {·} represents
the probability and Kv (·) denotes the v-th order modified
Bessel function of the second kind. The probability density
function (PDF) and cumulative distribution function (CDF) are
expressed by fX (·) and FX (·), respectively. Finally, log2 (·)
is the logarithm.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a DF multi-relay system as shown in Fig. 1,
which deploys one power beacon B, one source S, M relays
Rm,m ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M}, one destinationD, one eavesdropper
E and all nodes equipped with a single antenna. All nodes
are operate in half-duplex (HD) mode. In order to improve
the secure performance of the considered system, the SRS
and ORS schemes are used to select the optimal relay among
theM relays, while RRS scheme is presented as a benchmark.
The source and all relay nodes are energy-constrained and can
harvest energy from nearby B according to the TS protocol.
1In some cases, the eavesdropper can simultaneously receive signals from
both source and relays. Our work can be easily extended to these cases by
combining the received signals from source and relays using the selection
combining or MRC.
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Fig. 1. System Model
It is considered that there is no direct link of S → D due to
the blockage or heavy shadowing.
In fact, it is difficult to obtain perfect CSI in the commu-
nication process because of the CEEs, and the most common
method is to estimate the channel using the training sequence.
In this study, the linear minimum mean square error (LMMSE)
is adopted here. Thus, the channel can be modeled as
hj = hˆj + ej , (1)
where hˆj , j ∈ {SRm, SE,RmD,RmE} , (1 ≤ m ≤M) is
estimated channel of the real channel hj , ej ∼ CN
(
0, σ2ej
)
is the CEE, where σ2ej is the variance of estimation error and
which is considered in two representative channel estimation
models: 1) It is a non-negative fixed constant; 2) It is a
function of transmit average SNR and can be modeled as
σ2ej = Ωj/(1 + δρjΩj), where δ is the channel estimation
quality parameter that indicates the power consumption of the
training pilot to obtain CSI; Ωj and ρj are the variance of
channel gain and transmit average SNR, respectively [40]. We
assume that all communication links are subject to Rayleigh
fading and path loss [41].
Typically, IQI is modeled as the phase and/or amplitude im-
balance between transceiver I and Q signal paths. As depicts in
[42, 43], the asymmetrical IQI model can be considered, where
I branch and Q branch are assumed to be ideal and errors,
respectively. Here, both transmitter (TX) and receiver (RX)
are subject to IQI, in which case the transmitted baseband
signals can be expressed as
xIQI = µt/ryj + vt/ry
∗
j , (2)
where yj =
√
PS/Rxj is the baseband signal that is trans-
mitted under the conditions of non-ideal I/Q matching with
E
{
|xj |
2
}
= 1, xj is the transmit signal of the TX, PS
and PRm are the transmit power at S and Rm, respectively;
The IQI coefficients are given by µt =
1
2 (1 + ξt exp (jφt)),
vt =
1
2 (1− ξt exp (−jφt)), µr =
1
2 (1 + ξr exp (−jφr)),
vr =
1
2 (1− ξr exp (jφr)), where ξt/r and φt/r denote the
amplitude and phase mismatch at TX and RX, respectively
[44]. For ideal conditions, the parameters are set to ξt/r = 1
and φt/r = 0
◦ [45].
4The entire data transmission is completed in three phases:
1) S and relays harvest energy from nearby power beacon B;
2) S transmits its own signals to Rm and E; 3) Rm decodes
and forwards the signals to D and E.
1) The first phase: In this phase, S and Rm are equipped
with nonliear harvesters can reap energy from B. The har-
vested energy at S is
ES = ς1PB|hBS |
2
αT, (3)
where ς1 ∈ (0, 1) is the energy converse coefficient of
harvester at S; PB is the transmitted power at B; hBS is the
channel coefficient between B and S; α is the time allocation
factor for EH, and T is the block transmission duration. The
harvested energy ES is used for information transmission in
the second phase. The transmit power PS can be expressed as
follows in the case of the nonlinear energy harvester [38]
PS =
{
2ας1PB
1−α |hBS |
2
, ifPB|hBS |
2 ≤ Γ1
2ας1
1−αΓ1, ifPB|hBS |
2
> Γ1
, (4)
where Γ1 is the saturation threshold of the harvester at S.
Similarly, the energy harvested at Rm can be expressed as
ERm = ς2PB|hBRm |
2
αT, (5)
where ς2 ∈ (0, 1) is the energy conversion coefficient of
harvester at Rm, and hBRm is the channel coefficient from
B to Rm. The harvested energy ERm at relays is used for the
information transmission in the third phase. In the presence of
the nonlinear energy harvester, the transmit power at relay is
given as follows
PRm =
{
2ας2PB
1−α |hBRm |
2
, ifPB|hBRm |
2 ≤ Γ2
2ας2
1−αΓ2, ifPB|hBRm |
2
> Γ2
, (6)
where Γ2 is the saturated threshold of the harvester at Rm .
2) The second phase: In this phase, S respectively sends the
signals xSRm and xSE to Rm and E with E
{
|xSRm |
2
}
=
E
{
|xSE |
2
}
= 1. Considering IQI and CEEs, the received
signals at Rm and E can be all written as (7) at the top of next
page, where hˆSRm and hˆSE are the estimated channel coeffi-
cients from transmitter to receiver; nSRm ∼ CN (0, NSRm)
and nSE ∼ CN (0, NSE) are the complex additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN).
3) The third phase: In the third phase, Rm respec-
tively sends the signals xRmD , xRmE to D and E with
E
{
|xRmD|
2
}
= E
{
|xRmE |
2
}
= 1. Similarly, the received
signals at D and E can be expressed as (7) at the top of next
page.2
Hence, the received signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio
(SINRs) at Rm, D and E can be expressed in a unified form
as
γj =
∣∣∣hˆj∣∣∣2ρjpj
σ2ejρjpj +
∣∣∣hˆj∣∣∣2ρjqj + σ2ejρjqj + gj , (8)
2Note that j ∈ {SRm, SE,RmD,RmE}, and PS and PRm are the
power from S and Rm, respectively.
where ρj = PS/R/Nj , pj =
∣∣∣µtjµrj + v∗tjvrj ∣∣∣2, qj =∣∣∣µrjvtj + µ∗tjvrj ∣∣∣2 and gj = ∣∣µrj + vrj ∣∣2.
According to the Shannon’s theorem, the channel capacity
can be expressed as follows
Cj =
1− α
2
log2 (1 + γj) , (9)
where the factor 1−α2 means the data transmission is accom-
plished in equal two phases.
With DF protocol, the effective end-to-end capacity from S
to D can be expressed as
CR = min (CSRm , CRmD) . (10)
III. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
This section analyzes the reliability and security of consid-
ered system in the presence of nonlinear energy harvester, IQI
and ICSI. The closed-form expressions for the OP under the
RRS, SRS, ORS schemes and IP under direct transmission
and relay transmission strategies are derived.3 Moreover, the
asymptotic behaviors for the OP are analyzed, as well as the
diversity orders.
A. Outage Probability Analysis
In this subsection, the expressions for the OP are presented
according the three RS strategies considered IQI, ICSI and
nonlinear energy harvesters. The OP is defined as the prob-
ability that effective channel capacity is below the threshold
Rth, which can be expressed as
Pout
∆
= Pr {CR < Rth} . (11)
1) Random relay selection: For RRS strategy, the link
between S and arbitrary one of the relay Rm is selected, and
the effective rate can be obtained as
CRm = min (CSRm , CRmD) . (12)
Based on the above discussion, we can obtain the analytical
expression for the OP of the RRS strategy in the following
theorem.
Theorem 1. The analytical expression for the OP of RRS
strategy is provided in (13) as shown at the top of next page.
where A1 =
2ας1
1−α , E1 =
Γ1
PB
, C1 = A1PB (pSRm − qSRmε),
C2 = σ
2
eSRm
A1PBε (pSRm+qSRm), T1 =
gSRmNSRmε
C1E1
+ C2C1 ,
β1 = 4λBSgSRmNSRmε, γ1 =
λSRm
C1
, Λ1 = C1T1−C2, δl1 =
cos
[
(2l1−1)pi
2Y1
]
, Θ1 =
εσ2eSRm
A1Γ1(pSRm+qSRm )+εgSRmNSRm
A1Γ1(pSRm−εqSRm )
,
A2 =
2ας2
1−α , E2 =
Γ2
PB
, C3 = A2PB (pRmD − qRmDε),
C4 = σ
2
eRmD
A2PBε (pRmD+qRmD), T3 =
gRmDNRmDε
C3E2
+ C4C3 , β2 = 4λBRmgRmDNRmDε,
γ2 =
λRmD
C3
, Λ2 = C3T3 − C4, δl2 = cos
[
(2l2−1)pi
2Y2
]
and Θ2 =
εσ2eRmD
A2Γ2(pRmD+qRmD)+εgRmDNRmD
A2Γ2(pRmD−εqRmD)
.
3The reliability and security are another metrics to characterize the PLS
of wireless communication systems without using any secrecy coding, which
are formulated by OP and IP [46].
5yj = µrj
[(
hˆj+ej
)(
µtj
√
PS/Rmxj+vtj
√
PS/Rmx
∗
j
)
+nj
]
+vrj
[(
hˆj+ej
)(
µtj
√
PS/Rmxj+vtj
√
PS/Rmx
∗
j
)
+nj
]∗
, (7)
PRRSout =1−

λSRm
C1
e−
λSRm
C2
C1

√β1
γ1
K1
(√
β1γ1
)
−
piΛ1
2Y1
Y1∑
l1=0
e
−
2λBSgSRm
NSRm
ε
Λ1(δl1+1)
−
λSRm
Λ1(δl1+1)
2C1
√
1−δ2l1

+eλBSE1(e−λSRmΘ1−e−λSRmT1)


×

λRmD
C3
e−
λRmD
C4
C3

√β2
γ2
K1
√
β2γ2−
piΛ2
2Y2
Y2∑
l2=0
e
−
2λBRm
gRmD
NRmD
ε
Λ2(δl2+1)
−
λRmD
Λ2(δl2+1)
2C3
√
1−δ2l2

+e−λBRmE2(e−λRmDΘ2−e−λRmDT3)

 , (13)
For ε < 1
/
max
{
pSRm
qSRm
,
pRmD
qRmD
}
, otherwise the OP expres-
sions are equal to 1.
Proof. See Appendix A.
To get deeper insights, the asymptotic behavior of non-ideal
conditions (σ2eSRm = σ
2
eRmD
= t) is investigated at high SNRs
in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. The asymptotic expression of OP for RRS
strategy under non-ideal conditions (σ2eSRm = σ
2
eRmD
= t)
is given by
PRRS,∞out = 1− e
−λSRmH1−λRmDH2 , (14)
where H1 = εσ
2
eSRm
(pSRm + qSRm)/pSRm − εqSRm and
H2 = εσ
2
eRmD
(pRmD + qRmD)/(pRmD − εqRmD).
Proof. Based on (9), the asymptotic channel capacities of S →
Rm and Rm → D can be written as
C∞,niSRm =
1−α
2
log2

1+
∣∣∣hˆSRm∣∣∣2pSRm
σ2eSRmpSRm+
∣∣∣hˆSRm∣∣∣2qSRm+σ2eSRmqSRm

 ,
(15)
C∞,niRmD=
1−α
2
log2

1+
∣∣∣hˆRmD∣∣∣2pRmD
σ2eRmDpRmD+
∣∣∣hˆRmD∣∣∣2qRmD+σ2eRmDqRmD

 .
(16)
By the definition of OP, the following expression can be
obtained as
P∞,niout = Pr
{
min
(
C∞,niSRm , C
∞,ni
RmD
)
< Rth
}
= 1−Pr
{
C∞,niSRm >Rth
}
Pr
{
C∞,niRmD >Rth
}
. (17)
Utilizing the similar methodology of Appendix A, (14) can
be derived.
Furthermore, the diversity order is investigated, which can
be defined as [31]:
d = − lim
ρj→∞
log (P∞out)
log ρj
, (18)
where ρj is the average SNR and P
∞
out is the asymptotic OP.
Corollary 2. The diversity order of OP for RRS scheme in
the presence of non-ideal conditions (σ2eSRm = σ
2
eRmD
= t)
can be obtained as follows:
dniRRS (ρSRm , ρRmD) = 0. (19)
Proof. Follows trivially by using (18) and the definition of
derivative.
Remark 1. From Theorem 1, Corollary 1 and Corollary 2,
the following observations can be obtained as: 1) When M
increases gradually, it can be seen that (13) and (14) are
independent of M , so the RRS scheme will not change with
the increase or decrease of the number of antennas; 2) At high
average SNR, PRRS,∞out is a fixed constant, which results in 0
diversity order. This means that the diversity order can not be
improved by increasing the number of relays.
2) Suboptimal relay selection: For SRS strategy, the opti-
mal relay is selected according to maximizing the capacity of
the link S → Rm, which can be expressed as
a = arg max
m=1,2,···M
CSRm , (20)
CRa = min (CSRa , CRaD) . (21)
Based on (11) and (20), we have the following Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. The analytical expression of OP is provided for
SRS strategy in (22) as shown at the top of next page.
where Ξ = −MλSRa
M−1∑
s=0
(
M − 1
s
)
(−1)s, C5 =
A1PB (pSRa − qSRaε), C6 = σ
2
eSRa
A1PBε (pSRa + qSRa),
T5 =
gSRaNSRaε
C5E1
+ C6C5 , β3 = 4λBSgSRaNSRaε, γ3 =
λSRa (s+1)
C5
, Λ3 = C5T5 − C6, δl3 = cos
[
(2l3−1)pi
2Y3
]
, C7 =
A2PB (pRaD − qRaDε), C8 = σ
2
eRaD
A2PBε (pRaD + qRaD),
T7 =
gRaDNRaDε
C7E2
+ C8C7 , β4 = 4λBRagRaDNRaDε, γ4 =
λRaD
C7
, Λ4 = C7T7 − C8 and δl4 = cos
[
(2l4−1)pi
2Y4
]
.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Similarly, the asymptotic behavior of non-ideal conditions
is studied of OP for SRS strategy in the high SNR regime.
6PSRSout = 1 +

 Ξ
C5
e
−
λSRa
(s+1)C6
C5

√β3
γ3
K1
(√
β3γ3
)
−
piΛ3
2Y3
Y3∑
l3=0
e
−
2λBSgSRm
NSRa
ε
Λ3(δl3+1)
−
λSRa
(s+1)Λ3(δl3+1)
2C5
√
1− δ2l3


−
Ξ
λSRa(s+1)
e−λBSE1−λSRa(s+1)T5−
[
1−
(
1−e−λSRaΘ3
)M]
e−λBSE1
)
×
(
e−λBRaE2
(
e−λRaDΘ4 − e−λRaDT7
)
+
λRaD
C7
e−
λRaD
C8
C7

√β4
γ4
K1
√
β4γ4 −
piΛ4
2Y4
Y4∑
l4=0
e
−
2λBRa
gRmD
NRaD
ε
Λ4(δl4+1)
−
λRaD
Λ4(δl4+1)
2C7
√
1− δ2l4



 , (22)
Corollary 3. The asymptotic expression for the OP of SRS
strategy under non-ideal conditions (σ2eSRa = σ
2
eRaD
= t) is
given by
PSRS,∞out = 1−
(
1−
(
1− e−λSRaH3
)M)
e−λRaDH4 , (23)
whereH3 = εσ
2
eSRa
(pSRa + qSRa)/pSRa − εqSRa andH4 =
εσ2eRaD (pRaD + qRaD)/(pRaD − εqRaD).
Then, the diversity order of OP for SRS strategy under non-
ideal conditions (σ2eSRa = σ
2
eRaD
= t) is presented in the
following corollary.
Corollary 4. The diversity order of OP for SRS scheme in
the presence of non-ideal conditions (σ2eSRm = σ
2
eRmD
= t) is
given by:
dniSRS (ρSRa , ρRaD) = 0. (24)
Remark 2. From Theorem 2, Corollary 3 and Corollary 4, we
can obtain the following information as: 1) when the number
of relay increases, it can be concluded from formulas (22)
and (23) that the system’s outage performance becomes better
under the SRS strategy; 2) From expression (22), it can be
obtained that when the M is fixed and the transmit power at
B is in a high state, the OP will cause an error floor; 3) From
(24), we can observe that the diversity order of the considered
system is zero due to the fixed constant for the OP in the high
SNR regime.
3) Optimal relay selection: For ORS strategy, the optimal
relay is selected according to maximize the capacity of the
links both S → Rm and Rm → D
m∗ = arg max
1≤m≤M
min {CSRm , CRmD} , (25)
CRm∗ = max
1≤m≤M
CRm . (26)
According to (11) and (26), Theorem 3 can be obtained as
following.
Theorem 3. The analytical expression of the OP is provided
for the ORS strategy in (27) as shown at the top of next page.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Next, the asymptotic behavior for the OP of ORS strategy
in the presence of non-ideal conditions is studied.
Corollary 5. The asymptotic expression of OP for the ORS
strategy under non-ideal conditions (σ2eSRa = σ
2
eRaD
= t) is
given by
PORS,∞out =
M∏
i=1
(
1− e−λSRmH1−λRmDH2
)
. (28)
Corollary 6. The diversity order of OP for ORS strategy under
non-ideal conditions (σ2eSRm = σ
2
eRmD
= t) is following:
dniORS (ρSRm , ρRmD) = 0. (29)
Remark 3. From Theorem 3, Corollary 5 and Corollary 6,
we can get the following points as: 1) When M increases,
PORSout and P
ORS,∞
out will become smaller because, which
means that the system’s outage performance becomes better
under the ORS strategy; 2) As PB goes to infinity, the OP
of the considered system under non-ideal conditions has an
error floor; 3) We can also observe that the diversity order is
0, which means that the slope of the outage probability is 0.
B. Intercept Probability Analysis
In this subsection, the secrecy performance of the multi-
relay networks with IQI is studied in terms of IP considering
two scenarios of direct transmission and transmission via relay.
The definition of IP is the probability that the channel capacity
between S → E or Rm → E is greater than the thresholdRth,
which can be formulated as
P
direct/relay
int
∆
= Pr
{
CSE/RcE > Rth
}
, (30)
whereRc is the selected relay, CSE and CRcE are the intercept
capacities of S → E and Rc → E, respectively.
1) Direct Transmission: Under the condition of direct trans-
mission, based on (8) and the definition of (30), the closed-
form analytical expression of IP under the condition of direct
transmission can be obtained as Theorem 4.
Theorem 4. The analytical expression of IP under the condi-
tion of direct transmission is provided in (31) as shown at the
top of next page.
where C9 = A1PB (pSE − qSEε), C10 =
σ2eSEA1PBε (pSE + qSE), T9 = εgSENSE/C9E1 +C10/C9,
β5 = λBSgSENSEε, γ5 =
λSE
C9
, Λ5 =
C9T9 − C10, δl5 = cos [(2l5 − 1)pi/2Y5] and Θ5 =
εσ2eSEA1Γ1 (pSE + qSE) + εgSENSE/A1Γ1 (pSE − εqSE).
Proof. See Appendix D.
7PORSout =
M∏
m=1

1−

λSRm
C1
e
−
λSRm
C2
C1

√β1
γ1
K1
(√
β1γ1
)
−
piΛ1
2Y1
Y1∑
l1=0
e
−
2λBSgSRm
NSRm
ε
Λ1(δl1+1)
−
λSRm
Λ1(δl1+1)
2C1
√
1−δ2l1

+eλBSE1 (e−λSRmΘ1−e−λSRmT1)


×

λRmD
C3
e
−
λRmD
C4
C3

√β2
γ2
K1
√
β2γ2−
piΛ2
2Y2
Y2∑
l2=0
e
−
2λBRm
gRmD
NRmD
ε
Λ2(δl2+1)
−
λRmD
Λ2(δl2+1)
2C3
√
1−δ2l2

+e−λBRmE2(e−λRmDΘ2−e−λRmDT3)



 , (27)
P directint =−e
−λBSE1−λSET9+
λSE
C9
e
−
λSEC10
C9

2
√
β5
γ5
K1
(
2
√
β5γ5
)
−
piΛ5
2Y5
Y5∑
l5=0
e
−
γ5Λ5(δl5+1)
2 −
2β5
Λ5(δl5+1)
√
1−δ2l5

+e−λSEΘ5−λBSE1 , (31)
2) Transmission via Relay: We then studied the security of
the considered system by utilizing relay to transmit informa-
tion in the following theorem.
Theorem 5. The analytical expression of IP under the trans-
mission via relay condition is provided in (32) as shown at
the top of next page.
where C11 = A2PB (pRcE − qRcEε), C12 =
σ2eRcEA2PBε (pRcE + qRcE), T11 = gRcENRcEε/C11E2 +
C12/C11, β6 = 4λBRcgRcENRcEε, γ6 = λRcE/C11,
Λ6 = C11T11 − C12, δl6 = cos [(2l6 − 1)pi/2Y6] and Θ6 =
εσ2eRcEA2Γ2(pRcE+qRcE)+εgRcENRcE/A2Γ2 (pRcE−εqRcE).
Proof. See Appendix E.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, some numerical results are provided to
validate the correctness of the obtained results in the above
section. The results are then verified using Monte Carlo
simulations with 107 iterations. Unless otherwise specified,
we set the parameters as in Table I.
A. Reliability Analysis
Fig. 2 plots the OP versus the transmit power PB for
different RS strategies. For the purpose of comparison, the
curves of ideal conditions are provided. We set M = 2. These
simulation results perfectly verify the derived closed-form
analytical expressions of (13), (22) and (27) and asymptotic
expressions of (14), (23) and (28), as well as (19), (24) and
(29). We can also see from the simulation results that: 1)
OP under the non-ideal conditions is greater than that the
ideal conditions due to the IQI and CEEs; 2) The outage
performance under RRS strategy is worse than SRS and ORS
strategies, and ORS scheme has the best outage performance;
3) There are error floors of the OP for the three RS schemes
at high SNRs due to CEEs, which means that the system
OP performance can not always be improved by increasing
transmit power.
Fig. 3 (a) illustrates the OP of TX/RX amplitude ξt/r
for different number of relays (M = {2, 4}) under two RS
strategies. We set PB = 20 dB. These results indicate that the
OP for SRS scheme is higher than that of ORS scheme for
arbitrary number of relay (M > 1). The gap of OP between the
two schemes becomes large as the number of relays increases.
Also, we can see that the outage performance of the considered
system is proportional to the M . Finally, the OP of the system
increases gradually with the increase of TX/RX amplitude,
which means that the ξt/r has negative effects on the system
performance. Fig. 3 (b) plots the OP versus phase mismatch
φt/r for different number of relays under two RS strategies.
As in Fig. 3 (a), we set PB = 20dB. These simulation results
verify that with the increase of φt/r, the outage performance of
the system gradually becomes worse. Furthermore, the effects
of the number of relays on the system performance in Fig. 2
and Fig. 3 are further verified. From Fig. 3 (a) and Fig. 3 (b),
we can observe that the parameters of amplitude and phase
mismatches have the same effects on the outage performance.
Fig. 4 shows the OP versus transmit power PB under three
RS strategies for different CEE parameters. In this simulation,
we set M = 2. The simulation results reveal that: 1) when
σ2e is a non-negative constant, the OPs for the three RS
schemes are positively correlated with CEE parameters; 2)
When σ2e = Ω/(1 + δρΩ), the OPs decreases with the increase
of δ, which means the reliability of the system increases
gradually; 3) There are error floors for the OP of the three
RS schemes due to fixed non-negative CEEs.
Fig. 5 shows the OP versus PB for different time allo-
cation efficiencies α ∈ {0.2, 0.4, 0.6} with M = 2. We
have the following observations that: 1) when transmit power
PB ∈ [0dB : 24dB], the outage performance of the system
becomes stronger as the α gets larger, that is, the reliability
of the system increases; 2) when PB ∈ [24dB : 28dB],
these simulation results show that OP at α = 0.6 is higher
than α = 0.4; 3) when PB ∈ [28dB : 32dB], the outage
performance in the case of α = 0.6 is worse than that in
α = 0.2 and with the increase of α = 0.2; 0.4, the OP of the
system decreases; 4) when PB ∈ [32dB : 40dB], the OP of
the system gradually weakens with α = 0.6; 0.4; 0.2, that is,
the outage performance of the system gradually improves with
the changing order of time allocation efficiency.
Fig. 6 (a) and Fig. 6 (b) plot the OP versus energy conver-
sion coefficients for the three RS schemes. In this simulation,
the parameters are set M = 2, ς2 = 0.5 in Fig. 6 (a) and
ς1 = 0.5 in Fig. 6 (b). From Fig. 6 (a) and Fig. 6 (b), we
can see that the OPs under the case of the three RS schemes
8P relayint =e
−λBRcE2
(
e−λRcEΘ6−e−λRcET11
)
+
λRcE
C11
e
−
λRcE
C12
C11

√β6
γ6
K1
√
β6γ6−
piΛ6
2Y6
Y6∑
l6=0
e
−
β6
2Λ6(δl6+1)
−
γ6Λ6(δl6+1)
2
√
1−δ2l6

 , (32)
TABLE I
PARAMETERS FOR NUMERICAL RESULTS
Monte Carlo simulations repeated 107 iterations
Distance between nodes dRmD = dRmE = 1.5, dSE = 2
Shadow fading parameter β = 3
Time allocation factor α = 0.5
Noise power NSRm = NSE = NRmD=NRmE = 1
Intercept capacity threshold Rth = 0.05
Amplitude at TX and RX ξt = ξr = {1, 1.1},
Phase at TX and RX φt = φr = {0◦, 5◦}
Variance of CEEs ς1 = ς2 = 0.5
Energy converse coefficient at source and relay σ2e = {0, 0.05}
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Fig. 2. OP versus the transmit power for different relay selection strategies.
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Fig. 3. Influence of IQI: (a) OP versus TX/RX amplitude; (b) OP versus
phase mismatch.
degrade when the ς1 and ς2 grow, i.e. the reliability of the
system enhances with the increase of the energy conversion
coefficients of the system.
B. Security Analysis
Fig. 7 investigates the IP versus transmit power PB for dif-
ferent threshold rates and link schemes under two conditions.
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Fig. 4. OP versus the transmit power for different CEE parameters.
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Fig. 5. OP versus the transmit power for different time allocation factors.
The parameters is set as M = 2. For different threshold rates,
it can be seen that the IP of the system decreases as the Rth
increases, and it can be obtained that the IP in direct link
transmission condition is less than that in relay transmission
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Fig. 6. Influence of energy conversion coefficient: (a) OP versus ς1; (b) OP
versus ς2.
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Fig. 7. IP versus the transmit power for different threshold rates and
transmission schemes.
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Fig. 8. IP versus the transmit power for different CEE parameters.
condition. This means that cooperative relay can improve the
system performance by shortening the distance between source
and destination. We further explore that the IP in the ideal
case is smaller than the non-ideal case, that is, the presence
of IQI and ICSI in the system will strengthen the security of
the system in the high SNR region.
Fig. 8 illustrates the IP versus PB for different CEE σ
2
e .
In this simulation, two CEE cases are considered: 1) σ2e is a
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Fig. 9. IP versus the TX/RX amplitude for different phase mismatch.
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Fig. 10. IP versus the energy converse coefficient for different time allocation
factors.
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Fig. 11. OP and IP versus the time allocation factor for different transmission
strategies.
non-negative constant; 2) σ2e is the function of transmit average
SNR. In this simulation, we set M = 2. It can be seen that
with the aggravation of CEE parameters, the IP of the system
10
becomes smaller. This means that IQI parameters are beneficial
to the system IP. Similarly, it can be further concluded that the
IP of the system under relay transmission condition is greater
than the IP under direct transmission condition.
Fig. 9 shows the IP versus TX/RX amplitude ξt/r for dif-
ferent phase mismatch φt/r = {0
◦; 20◦; 40◦}. The simulation
results show that the IP under two transmission schemes of the
system degrades with the increase of IQI parameter ξt/r and
phase mismatch φt/r. This means that the IQI existing in this
system is negatively correlated with IP under the conditions.
Fig. 10 plots the IP versus energy conversion coefficient ς1/2
at S and Rm for different α with PB = 5 dB. From the Fig. 10,
we can draw the following conclusions: 1) Under the condi-
tions of IQI and CEEs, the IP for the two transmission schemes
of the system is proportional to the time allocation factor; 2)
With the increases of energy conversion coefficient, the IP
under different time allocation factors gradually increases.
Fig. 11 illustrates that the OP under three RS strategies and
IP under two transmission link schemes versus time allocation
factor α. As can be seen from the simulation, when α
increases, the OP of the proposed three RS schemes decreases
first and then increases, while IP under two transmission
schemes increases first and then decreases in the whole range,
which means that there is an optimal value in the process
of α gradually increasing. In addition, the optimal solution
to balance the reliability and security of the system under
consideration can be obtained.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we investigate the reliability and security of
multi-relay networks in terms of OP and IP in the presence
of IQI, ICSI, and nonlinear energy harvesters. To improve
the security performance, three RS schemes are considered.
For reliability, we analyze the asymptotic behavior in the high
SNR regime and discuss the diversity order. For security, we
consider two representative cases. Theoretical analysis and
experiment results prove that: 1) The OP of the considered
system increases as the TX/RX amplitude and phase increases;
2) As the number of relays increases, the system’s outage
performance becomes better; 3) Different CEE modes have
different effects on the system. When the parameter is a non-
negative constant, the OP of the system increases as σ2e in-
creases. When the parameter is a variable, the OP decreases as
δ increases; 4) The performance of the system is proportional
to IP and energy conversion coefficient; 5) There is a trade-off
between reliability and security, that is, when the performance
of the interruption is relaxed, IP can be enhanced, and vice
versa; 6) When the system is under the condition of nonideal
and the CEEs parameter is a constant, the OP exists error floor.
The work of our paper are focusing on the secure per-
formance of wireless-powered relaying networks affected by
IQI, however, our analysis are by no means conclusive and
the system performance suffers from other hardware factors,
such as, phase noise, amplifier non-linearities and quantization
error, etc. To this end, the analytical method of our work
can be extended to the above the hardware imperfections. In
fact, the ICSI is caused not only by CCE at receiver, but
also by feedback delay at the transmitter. Our analysis can
be extended to investigate the secure performance of multi-
antenna cooperative systems. The above exciting extensions
would be done as our future work.
APPENDIX A: PROOF OF THEOREM 1
According to the definition of OP and (8), the following
expression can be obtained as:
PRRSout =Pr{min (CSRm , CRmD)<Rth}
= 1−Pr{CSRm>Rth}︸ ︷︷ ︸
I1
Pr {CRmD>Rth}︸ ︷︷ ︸
I2
. (A.1)
Substituting (8) into (A1), set ε = 2
2Rth
1−α and the I1 can be
rewritten as:
I1=Pr


∣∣∣ˆhSRm∣∣∣2ρSRmpSRm
σ2eSRmρSRmpSRm+
∣∣∣ˆhSRm∣∣∣2ρSRmqSRm+σ2eSRmρSRmqSRm+gSRm
>ε


=M1 +M2, (A.2)
where
M1=Pr

 gSRmNSRmεC1∣∣∣ˆhSRm∣∣∣2−C2<|hBS|
2≤E1,
∣∣∣ˆhSRm∣∣∣2≥gSRmNSRmεC1E1 +C2C1

 ,
and
M2 = Pr
{∣∣∣hˆSRm∣∣∣2 > Θ1, |hBS |2 > E1
}
= e−λSRmΘ1−λBSE1 , (A.3)
in there, T2 =
gSRmNSRmε
C1|hˆSRm |
2
−C2
.
Substituting the PDF and CDF of Rayleigh fading into (A3),
the following formula can be obtained by further calculation
as:
M1 = −λSRm
(
e−λBSE1ϕ1 − ϕ2
)
, (A.4)
ϕ1 =
∫ ∞
T1
e−λSRmydy =
1
λSRm
e−λSRmT1 , (A.5)
according to the formula (3.324.1) in [47] and the following
expression (A7) of Gaussian-Chebyshev quadrature [48], the
ϕ2 of the top of next page can be obtained as∫ Λ
0
g (x) dx ≈
piΛ
2Y
Y∑
l=0
g
(
Λ (δl + 1)
2
)√
1− δ2l , (A.6)
Substituting (A6) and (A8) into (A5), the M1 can be derived.
Then substituting (A4) and (A5) into (A2), the I1 can be
obtained.
Substituting (8) into (A1), the I2 of following expression
can be rewritten as
I2 = M3 +M4 (A.8)
Similar to the calculation of I1, the M3 in the top of next
page and M4 can be obtained as follows and
M4 = e
−λRmDΘ2−λBRmE2 , (A.10)
put (A10) and (A11) into (A9), the I2 can be derived.
Substituting the expressions of I1 and I2, the (13) can be
obtained.
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ϕ2 =
∫ ∞
T1
e−λSRmye
−
λBSgSRm
NSRm
ε
C1x−C2 dy
=
1
C1
e−
λSRm
C2
C1
[√
β1
γ1
K1
(√
β1γ1
)
−
piΛ1
2Y1
Y1∑
l1=0
e
−
2λBSgSRm
NSRm
ε
Λ1(δl1+1)
−
λSRm
Λ1(δl1+1)
2C1
√
1− δ2l1

 , (A.7)
M3=−e
−λBRmE2−λRmDT3+
λRmD
C3
e−
λRmD
C4
C3

√β2
γ2
K1
√
β2γ2−
piΛ2
2Y2
Y2∑
l2=0
e
−
2λBRm
gRmD
NRmD
ε
Λ2(δl2+1)
−
λRmD
Λ2(δl2+1)
2C3
√
1−δ2l2

 , (A.9)
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF THEOREM 2
For SRS strategy, substituting (21) into (11), the following
expression can be obtained as
PSRSout = Pr {min (CSRa , CRaD) < Rth}
= 1− Pr {CSRa > Rth}︸ ︷︷ ︸
I3
Pr {CRaD > Rth}︸ ︷︷ ︸
I4
, (B.1)
the CDF and PDF of
∣∣∣hˆSRa∣∣∣2 can be written as
F|hˆRaD|
2 (y) =
[
1− e−λRaDy
]M
, (B.2)
f|ˆhSRa|
2(y)=MλSRa
M−1∑
s=0
(
M−1
s
)
(−1)se−λSRa(s+1)y. (B.3)
Similar to the calculation process of Appendix A, the I3
and I4 can be expressed as
I3 =M5 +M6, (B.4)
where
M5 =Pr
{
|hBS|
2
(
C5
∣∣∣ˆhSRa∣∣∣2−C6
)
>gSRmNSRaε, |hBS|
2≤E1
}
= Ξ
(
e−λBSE1ϕ5 − ϕ6
)
, (B.5)
ϕ5 =
∫ ∞
T5
e−λSRa (s+1)xdx =
1
λSRa (s+ 1)
e−λSRa(s+1)T5 ,
(B.6)
the ϕ6 in the top of next page, and
M6 = Pr
{∣∣∣hˆSRa∣∣∣2 > Θ3, |hBS |2 > E1
}
=
[
1−
(
1− e−λSRaΘ3
)M]
e−λBSE1 , (B.8)
putting (B6) and (B7) into (B5), the M5 can be obtained;
substituting (B5) and (B8) into (B4), the I3 can be derived.
Then, substituting (8) into (B1), the following formula can
be expressed as
I4 =M7 +M8, (B.9)
where
M7 =Pr
{
|hBRa|
2
(
C7
∣∣∣ˆhRaD∣∣∣2−C8
)
>gRmDNRaDε, |hBRa|
2≤E2
}
= −λRaD
(
e−λBRaE2ϕ7 − ϕ8
)
, (B.10)
ϕ7 =
∫ ∞
T7
e−λRaDydy =
1
λRaD
e−λRaDT7 , (B.11)
the ϕ8 in the top of next page andM8 is obtained as following
M8 = Pr
{∣∣∣hˆRaD∣∣∣2 > Θ4, |hBRa |2 > E2
}
= e−λRaDΘ4−λBRaE2 , (B.13)
putting (B11) and (B12) into (B10), the M7 can be obtained;
substituting (B10) and (B13) into (B9), the I4 can be derived.
Substituting I3 and I4 into (B1), the (22) can be obtained.
APPENDIX C: PROOF OF THEOREM 3
According to the definition of (11) and (25), the following
expression for ORS strategy can be obtained as
PORSout = Pr {CRm∗ < Rth}
= Pr
{
max
1≤m≤M
min {γSRm , γRmD} < ε
}
=
M∏
m=1
(1− I1I2), (C.1)
put I1 and I2 of Appendix A into (C1), the (26) can be
obtained.
APPENDIX D: PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Substituting (8) into (30), the following expression can be
obtained as
P directint
∆
=Pr{CSE>Rth}
= M9 +M10. (D.1)
Similar to the Appendix A, the M9 and M10 can be
expressed as
M9=Pr


gSENSEε
C9
∣∣∣hˆSE∣∣∣2−C10︸ ︷︷ ︸
T9
<
∣∣∣hˆBS∣∣∣2≤E1, ∣∣∣hˆSE∣∣∣2≥gSENSEε
C9E1
+
C10
C9︸ ︷︷ ︸
T10


= −λSE
(
e−λBSE1ϕ9−ϕ10
)
, (D.2)
12
ϕ6 =
∫ ∞
T5
e−λSRa (s+1)x−λBST6dx
=
1
C5
e−
λSRa
(s+1)C6
C5

√β3
γ3
K1
(√
β3γ3
)
−
piΛ3
2Y3
Y3∑
l3=0
e
−
2λBSgSRm
NSRa
ε
Λ3(δl3+1)
−
λSRa
(s+1)Λ3(δl3+1)
2C5
√
1− δ2l3

 , (B.7)
ϕ8 =
1
C7
e−
λRaD
C8
C7

√β4
γ4
K1
√
β4γ4 −
piΛ4
2Y4
Y4∑
l4=0
e
−
2λBRa
gRmD
NRaD
ε
Λ4(δl4+1)
−
λRaD
Λ4(δl4+1)
2C7
√
1− δ2l4

 , (B.12)
M10 = Pr
{∣∣∣hˆSE∣∣∣2 > Θ5, ∣∣∣hˆBS∣∣∣2 > E1}
= e−λSEΘ5−λBSE1 , (D.3)
where
ϕ9 =
∫ ∞
T9
e−λSEydy =
1
λSE
e−λSET9 , (D.4)
and ϕ10 on the top of next page. Putting (D4) and (D5) into
(D2), the M9 can be derived; then, substituting M9 and M10
into (D1), the (31) can be obtained.
APPENDIX E: PROOF OF THEOREM 5
Substituting (8) into (26), the following expression can be
obtained as
P relayint
∆
= Pr {CRcE > Rth}
=M11 +M12. (E.1)
Similar to the Appendix A, the M11 and M12 can be
expressed as
M11=Pr


gRcENRcDε
C9
∣∣∣ˆhRcD∣∣∣2−C10︸ ︷︷ ︸
T10
<|hBRc|
2≤E2,
∣∣∣ˆhRcE∣∣∣2≥gRcENRcEεC9E2 +C10C9︸ ︷︷ ︸
T9


= −λRcE
(
e−λBRcE2ϕ9 − ϕ10
)
, (E.2)
M12 = Pr
{∣∣∣hˆRcE∣∣∣2 > Θ5, |hBRc |2 > E2
}
= e−λRcEΘ5−λBRcE2 , (E.3)
where
ϕ9 =
∫ ∞
T9
e−λRcEydy =
1
λRcE
e−λRcET9 , (E.4)
and ϕ10 in the top of next page.
Putting (E4) and (E5) into (E2), the M11 can be derived;
then, substituting M11 and M12 into (E1), the (32) can be
obtained.
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